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Introduction
With few notable exceptions, the political organizations
forming South Africa's liberation movement have historically
underestimated the theoretical and practical significance of
political aspirations and social movements in the countryside
[Jordaan 1959; Bundy 1987:257; Weiner and Levin 1991:109-110;
Claassens 1991:156-157]. Throughout much of this century, the
principal efforts to address the political dimensions of the
agrarian question came from socialists who, influenced by
Communist and Trotskyist thought and experience, were
concerned with the peasantry's political potential,
particularly its potential to align with a proletarian-led
revolution. South African socialists struggled for decades
with the problem of the relationship between rural
proletarianization and peasant consciousness, a problem which
bedeviled European socialists as well [Banaji 1990], and they
anticipated more recent scholarly debates on rural development
and consciousness.1 Nonetheless, their own theoretical and
practical attention to the agrarian question has been sporadic
rather than sustained. From the 1920s through the 1950s South
African socialists held polarized views of the peasantry and
its political potential, a theoretical polarity which
manifested itself in an oscillating practice between town and
country.
This theoretical polarity reflected, in part, the
international socialist milieu in which the South African
movement emerged and from which it drew inspiration.
Socialist thought in South Africa developed within a broader,
European-centered movement which, from the mid-nineteenth
century, had privileged the urban proletariat as the leading
force in social change, a view reinforced by the 1917 Russian
Revolution, which most socialists used as a lens through which
they evaluated other societies and other attempts at socialist
mobilization.
Reflecting internal power struggles within the Soviet
Union, which spilled into the international socialist
movement, by the 1930s South African socialism had split into
two tendencies. The dominant tendency, represented by the
Communist Party of South Africa (CPSA) retained its allegiance
to the Communist International (Comintern). The minority
supported the struggle of Leon Trotsky and the Left
Opposition, a movement against Stalin's leadership of the
Soviet Union which broke from the Comintern's Third
International to form the Fourth International in 1938.
Theoretically, the Comintern adhered to Stalin's [1940]
aspiration to build socialism in one country and the corollary
notion of moving towards socialism in stages. Trotsky [1982],
by contrast, had formulated the theory of permanent revolution
to explain the circumstances in which proletarian revolutions
could take place in less developed countries without passing
through a stage of bourgeois democracy.
Cutting across the Communist-Trotskyist cleavage,
however, South African socialists were divided between a
majority giving primacy to the urban working class movement
and a minority which saw the agrarian question as the backbone
of any social revolution [Drew 1991:199-224; 456-505; Delius
1993:293-294, 302-303; Basner 1993:106-108]. The theoretical
dominance of the urban bias has been accentuated by two other
specifically South African factors: first, the long-term
practical difficulty of political organizing amongst rural
farmworkers and labor-tenants, due to the dispersed and
extremely repressive conditions on white farms; second, and
more recently, the rapid development and national visibility
of an organized, militant, urban black working class. The
dramatic upsurge of the black trade union movement in the
1970s shifted discussion away from considerations of an
agrarian revolution to prognostications of a black proletarian
revolution.
Thus, for much of socialism's history in South Africa,
the discourse and the concepts that its proponents used to
analyze the agrarian question were formulated with respect to
agrarian conditions and socialist experience in Europe. In
the 1940s and '50s, however, as a number of activists began
organizing in rural areas, socialists began developing
concepts and analyses based on South Africa's own empirical
conditions. Not coincidentally, this was also a period when,
despite the intense sectarianism dividing the left, the
observations of rural activists often coincided and their
analyses began to converge. Relatively little has been
written about these theoretical and practical endeavors and
their significance for understanding the relationship between
theoretical and conceptual constructs and political practice.
The blanket of repression which covered South Africa following
the notorious Sharpeville massacre of 1960 not only put an end
to open political activity in the next decade, it effectively
concealed many of these historical experiences.
The experiences of South African socialists raise
questions about the extent to which their methodological
approaches illuminated or obscured social conditions in South
Africa and about the degree to which models or concepts, which
are essentially abstractions derived from particular empirical
conditions and constructed by prioritizing certain empirical
variables over others, can be applied in an illuminating
manner to other conditions.2 These experiences also indicate
the centrality of practical work in validating or modifying
such models or concepts in light of particular empirical
conditions or experiences.
Migrant labor and the peasantry
Two alternative perspectives have shaped discussions of
the peasantry and its political potential this century: one
stressing the primacy of political economy, particularly rural
proletarianization [Lenin 1974], the other, the primacy of the
peasantry's moral economy [Wolf 1966 and 1987; Scott 1985; ct.
Brass 1991:174-175].3 Lenin [1974:176] saw the peasantry as a
bedrock of capitalism, even as the weight of peasant tradition
slowed down capitalism's transformative effects. The social
disintegration produced by capitalism was critical in
understanding the peasantry's political potential, he
maintained. Through the migrant labor process, in particular,
the traditional peasantry was being replaced by a new rural
population in which the intermediate stratum or middle
peasantry was being squeezed between the extremes of the rural
proletariat and capitalist farming class. This social
disintegration set the basis for class struggle in the
countryside.
While Lenin stressed the peasantry's vulnerability and
disintegration into opposing classes, Eric Wolf has emphasized
the resilience of peasant social structures to external
change. It is capitalism's threat to peasant society which
pushes peasants out of their traditional conservativism to
participate in revolutionary movements [1987:368-9]. Migrant
labor provides the clue to this paradox of cultural
conservatism and revolutionary potential. The middle
peasantry engaged in migrant labor has ties to both town and
country, making it a transmitter of urban ideas. Thus,
according to Wolf, it is the industrial workforce which
retains rural ties rather than the industrial proletariat per
se, which is most potentially revolutionary. Moreover, he
maintains, those peasants with tactical leverage over
resources like land or with freedom to maneuver have the
greatest potential to sustain long-term revolt. This includes
the middle peasantry, which uses family labor to cultivate its
securely-held land, as well as peasants whose relative
independence from landlord control allows them "tactical
mobility" [1987:371-372].
The distinctive development and disintegration of the
South African peasantry poses a challenge to these dual
perspectives. South Africa's distinctive racial path of
capitalist development, as Hendricks [1993:4-7; 1990:162;
[1986?]:2] has argued, was based on blocking the development
of an African peasantry and impeding the development of a
stable black urban working class by deflecting
proletarianization to designated rural areas, called reserves
and later bantustans. This reserve-based population was drawn
into the labor force through the migrant labor system.
If nineteenth-century South Africa was dominated by
struggles amongst European colonizers and Africans over land,
by the end of the century, with British imperialism's
development of gold mining, capital's need for labor became
paramount. Control of land became secondary to the need to
incorporate workers into the migrant labor system [Jordaan
1959:12-17; Wilson 1972:234-256].
Following the Union of South Africa in 1910, the 1913
Native tand Act attempted to standardize state policy towards
the reserves. There, the "one man, one lot* principle, far
from promoting a homogenous peasantry, accelerated class
differentiation and proletarianization as land became
fragmented into economically unviable holdings. Although a
minority of cultivators in the late nineteenth century had
turned to commercial production and developed into a
prosperous peasantry, by the early twentieth century poverty
was driving Africans from the reserves into migrant labor on
farms and mines [MacMillan 1919, 1949:120-132; Roux 1949:171-
172; Jordaan 1959:12-13, 22; Bundy 1988; Lewis 1984).
Black tenants and sharecroppers suffered deteriorating
conditions on white farms, which were typically
undercapitalized. As competitive pressure intensified,
farmers increased the exploitation of tenant labor. The 1904
Master and Servants Ordinance deprived black tenants of legal
protection by defining them as servants instead of wage
laborers. The 1913 Land Act prohibited land sales to blacks
outside reserved areas and outlawed sharecropping and
squatting, making labor service the only legal means by which
tenants could pay rent, and precipitating mass evictions of
blacks from farms to the reserves [Plaatje 1987:49-66; Jordaan
1959:18-19; Keegan 1986b:182-4, 192-3]. But labor-intensive
farming methods typically remained more profitable than
capital-intensive ones well into the twentieth century. Only
after World War II, when state policy sought to modernize
white farming and capitalist investment in agriculture shot up
dramatically, did mechanization and wage and prison labor
displace labor-intensive tenant production [Jordaan 1959:25-
26; Keegan 1986b:30, 190-206; Mabin 1991:34]. In the 1980s,
about 20% of Africans were labor tenants [Mabin 1991:40;
Claasens 1991:150].
By the 1930s and '40s, rural poverty had reached epidemic
proportions, and Africans were flooding into towns despite
continued legislative efforts to restrict their movements
[Wilson 1972:161; Jordaan 1959:19]. The state enacted a
series of measures, including the Natives Land and Trust Act
in 1936, the Betterment Act and the Rehabilitation Scheme,
which aimed to stabilize the economic deterioration of the
reserves to ensure their viability as a base for migrant labor
which was to be a permanent social class in South Africa. The
effect of these measures was to increase economic
stratification and rural poverty. After World War II, the
Rehabilitation Scheme attempted to resettle sections of the
population into a variety of newly constructed villages where,
in some cases, government programs of afforestation and soil
conservation would be implemented to create reserve-based
proletarian settlements for migrant laborers and their
families [Roux 1949:189; Hirson, 1977:2-3, 11; Beinart and
Bundy 1980:297-298; Basner 1993:100-105; Hendricks 1990:96-
119]. However, these measures never fully halted the exodus
of blacks from the countryside or prevented the development of
a proletarian consciousness.
Communists and the agrarian question in the 1920s
South African socialism emerged in the early twentieth
century from the traditions of skilled British workers and
Eastern Europeans fleeing Tsarist repression [Johns 1976;
Mantzaris 1987]. This white, urban-based social composition
reinforced the classical socialist emphasis on the vanguard
role of the urban proletariat but gave it a particular twist.
Imbued with the racial ideology which rationalized colonial
conquest and British imperial penetration, early South African
socialists superimposed a racial paradigm on this model and
assumed white workers to be the political vanguard [Ntsebeza
1988). Africans, they believed, were better off in the rural
areas where they were not a threat to white workers. But by
the late 'teens, the continuing influx of black people to the
cities and mines made this deproletarianization thesis
untenable and, recognizing that blacks were a permanent part
of the industrial workforce, socialists began calling for
working class unity across the color line. In 1921 the CPSA
united a number of tiny groupings on the basis of their common
acceptance of the Comintern's 21 points. The CPSA's 1924
draft program called for a working class revolution which
would expropriate and redistribute large landholdings amongst
the landless rural population [SACP 1981:80-84].
In the late 1920s, under Comintern pressure, the CPSA
began to seriously reconsider the agrarian question. Between
1927 and 1929 the Comintern's agitation for the adoption of
the Native Republic thesis in South Africa pushed the CPSA
very painfully towards a reinterpretation of the relationship
between the national democratic and socialist struggles and
between the urban working class and rural majority [SACP
1981:90-106; Roux 1993:118-130]. The version of the thesis
adopted at the Party's seventh annual conference in 1929
proposed:
An Independent South African Native Republic as a
stage towards the Workers' and Peasants' Republic,
guaranteeing protection and complete equality to all
national minorities [SACP 1981:104].
The theoretical roots of the Native Republic thesis lie
in Marxist discussions on the national question in the early
years of this century, and the exchanges between the Polish
revolutionary, Rosa Luxemburg, and V. I. Lenin, both of whom
theorized from varied Eastern European experiences,
established the framework for subsequent Marxist discussions.4
In a crucial respect the Native Republic thesis differs from
earlier Marxist discussions and preceding Comintern policy.
All previous formulations had spoken of the right of oppressed
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nations to self-determination. Instead, the Native Republic
thesis proposed majority rule as a specific form of national
self-determination which would be a stage towards socialism.
The thesis proposed national-self determination through a
struggle against British imperialism, but this was an
imperialism defined not by its capitalist essence, but by its
colonial aspect, which included both foreign and racial
domination. From its emphasis on the seemingly colonial
character of South African society, flowed the
characterization of the peasantry and aspirant-peasantry as
the moving force of the South African revolution in the
absence of a black bourgeoisie and the view that "...the
national question in South Africa, which is based upon the
agrarian question lies at the foundation of the revolution in
South Africa." By giving primacy to the satisfaction of black
land hunger, argued the Comintern, South African Communists
would induce rural blacks to align themselves under
proletarian leadership, as in the Russian Revolution [SACP
1981:94].
South African Communist thinking polarized around the
thesis. Some broke from the Party over what they saw as the
slogan's alienation of white labor, still seen as a
potentially revolutionary social force. Others, like Jimmy La
Guma and Douglas and Mary Wolton, applauded the slogan's
emphasis on the needs of the black majority. Still others,
notably s. P. Bunting and T. W. Thibedi, thought the thesis
overemphasized the peasantry to the neglect of the
proletariat, black and white, although Bunting later modified
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his view and campaigned under the slogan [Drew 1991:125-151].
The polarization over the relative political significance
of workers and peasants can be seen in the contrasting
arguments of Bunting and another Communist, Albert Nzula. In
explaining his skepticism about the thesis at the Sixth
Comintern Congress in Moscow, Bunting focussed on the highly
differentiated class structure of the African population and
the underlying tendency towards proletarianization, even
claiming that there had not yet been any significant black
rural movement in South Africa. But Bunting's assessment of
rural movements was seriously off the mark in the late 1920s.
The decade had begun with a wave of rural anti-tax protests,
and by the late 1920s, the Industrial and Commercial Workers'
Union (ICU) was organizing black sharecroppers and labor-
tenants seeking to retain possession of their meager means of
production. Its decline through the 1930s reflected its
inability to stop the process of proletarianization. Nor were
rural protests confined to anti-proletarianization struggles.
In the Western Cape, the African National Congress1 (ANC)
organization of rural farmworkers became a groundswell, only
halted in the early 1930s by the brutal of farmers and the
state [Bunting 1928a, 1928b; Hofmeyr 1983, 1985; Nzula
1979:210-211] .
In contrast to Bunting's initial dismissal of rural
movements, Nzula argued that the British expropriation of
peasant land gave peasant revolts their anti-imperialist
thrust, manifested in their demand for "more land, less taxes"
[1979:104]. In South Africa, he argued [1979:199-201],
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imperialist exploitation occurred chiefly through the reserve
system, which made agricultural subsistence impossible for the
black majority. The concentration of landholdings and the
landlessness of the majority were barriers to peasant-based
economic development. Following the Comintern, Nzula
[1979:163] called for a two-stage revolution to eradicate pre-
capitalist relations and allow for free peasant development as
the basis for the gradual transition of national democracy
into socialism.
Just as Bunting's initial position did not accurately
reflect the development of rural movements in the late 1920s,
Nzula's analysis, too, abstracted away critical social forces,
seen in his dismissal of the South African working class as
even a potential social vanguard and in his presumption that
the democratic revolution would be bourgeois-led. In the late
1920s, 44% of all workers employed in private manufacturing
were Africans, who performed unskilled manual labor, while 38%
were white, typically performing skilled or supervisory work.
By contrast, there was no African bourgeoisie able to
accumulate capital by exploiting the labor-power of others,
and less than 1% of Africans could be described as formally-
educated and trained professionals.
The de facto proletarianization of reserve dwellers who,
despite being domiciled on the land, depended on wage labor,
lent credibility to Bunting's skepticism about the possibility
of a peasant-based revolution. In the mid-1930s, close to 83%
of all Africans lived in rural areas, mostly in reserves or
other scheduled areas where they had access to small plots of
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land, or on white farms, and approximately 62% of African
males and 87% of African females worked in agriculture and
forestry. They could not be neatly categorized as self-
sufficient peasants, however. Men based in the reserves were
contract or migrant workers on farms or mines. Typically, in
the 1930s, a third of the total male population was absent
from the reserves. In some areas, like the Ciskei, this
reached close to 100% of the adult male population. Outside
the reserves, most rural blacks worked on white-owned farms as
wage workers, squatters or tenant farmers [Van der Horst
1949:112-118; Natal University College 1949:312-313].
Although the Native Republic thesis pushed South African
Communists to examine the agrarian question and laid the basis
for organizational work which gave the Party a foothold in the
countryside [Roux 1993:131-147; Simons 1983:411-413], the
version articulated by the Comintern was inadequately grounded
in South Africa's material conditions. While the implicit
demand for return of the land struck a chord with recently
colonized blacks, the thesis too readily characterized most
Africans as a homogenous peasantry. As a result, socialists
polarized around the thesis, their various positions
reflecting their own perceptions of social class formation in
the countryside. The CPSA's 1929 program gave greater depth
and content to the thesis by including demands which
represented a variety of rural interests. But these demands
were incorporated into a particular framework which privileged
black peasant-based development through its acceptance of a
two-stage conception of change. The thesis priorized the
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needs of black peasants and aspirant peasants over those of
the virtually proletarianized reserve dwellers who depended on
migrant wage labor and those of the large agricultural
proletariat organized by the Western Cape ANC and Independent
ANC, whose demands indicated a proletariat seeking control
over working conditions rather than an aspirant peasantry
[Hofmeyr 1985:321-328].
Trotskyists and the agrarian question
With the Party's ultra-left turn in 1930, the Native
Republic thesis went into eclipse for several years as
Communists repudiated popular work in national organizations
in an effort to streamline and bolshevize the Party [Roux
1993:148-179; Roux 1964:269].
Notwithstanding this abrupt shift, the Native Republic
thesis had a profound impact on the socialist movement,
catalyzing the development of Trotskyism in South Africa.
Numerous individuals either left or were expelled from the
CPSA because of their objection to the top-down manner in
which the Comintern imposed the thesis. Others still
adamantly rejected what they saw as its subordination of the
working class struggle to bourgeois democratic aims [Roux
1993:156-158; Roux 1964:256; Simons 1983:424; Drew 1991:186-
187]. Methodologically, the thesis led to a polarization in
the way in which socialists conceptualized the relationship
between town and country which can be traced through several
decades.
Initially, Trotskyists simply inverted the Native
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Republic thesis, substituting the Utopian notion of a
proletariat united across color lines for the thesis'
assumption of a homogenous peasantry. Thus, the Cape Town-
based Lenin Club, formed in 1932 of a number of former
Communists, argued that the thesis
...is in complete contradiction to Marxism-Leninism,
for it places at the head of the Revolution the
backward Native peasantry, which is by far the
dominating element in the Native population, instead
of giving the sole leadership in the transition
period to the Working Class, black and white alike.
The Communist's cry for a 'Native Republic" would
doom the Revolution beforehand to failure, for never
in past history have the peasants alone been able to
carry a revolution to a successful issue [Lenin Club
4; cf. Southall 33-34].
Despite their common rejection of the thesis, Trotskyists
rapidly polarized over the agrarian question, and in 1934 the
Lenin Club split into two factions, the majority forming the
Workers' Party of South Africa (WPSA), and the minority, the
Communist League of South Africa (CLSA). In striking
respects, their arguments replicated the Communist debates of
the previous decade.
The WPSA took as its point of departure the distorted
social relations on the land. This was, it argued, the
material basis for the oppression of blacks, for the racial
division of the working class and for South Africa's economic
stagnation. The skewed racial distribution of landholdings
meant landlessness for the majority of blacks, forcing them to
labor on mines and white-owned farms. This huge pool of
ultra-cheap black labor was then used to threaten white job
security and push their wages down. Finally, the extremely
low level of economic development of the majority restricted
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the domestic market and stunted industrial development. The
WPSA characterized the rural black population, even the
agricultural proletariat, as a landless peasantry, and
contended that black land hunger would be the mobilizing force
and the pivot of a permanent revolution, which must be led by
a working class united across color lines [WPSA 1934:6].
Although strikingly close to the Native Republic thesis,
the WPSA believed that the thesis pandered to a black
nationalism which would impede working class unity. Instead,
it put forward "Land to the Natives" and "Every man has the
right to as much land as he can work" as slogans to mobilize
the black majority. In this way, it wrote,
The unconditional active support of the peasantry
will thus be assured to the proletarian revolution.
By popularising among the workers the needs of the
peasantry, and vice versa, the Bolsheviks succeeded
in their revolution. So also can our revolution
succeed. By uniting and defending in combined
effort the common aims and interests of the workers
and peasants, black and white, the revolutionary
movement can bring about the overthrow of Capitalism
and the establishment of a Soviet South Africa [WPSA
1934:6; emphasis in original].
By contrast, the CLSA argued that the immediate priority
lay in trade union work as a means to bridge the color bar and
thus to weaken British imperialism. To the extent that any
rural grouping had anti-imperialist potential at that stage,
argued the CLSA, it was the Afrikaner bywoners, not the
backwards black peasantry. But in its hope for a progressive
role for Afrikaner nationalism, the CLSA underestimated the
potential for the Afrikaner struggle against British
imperialism to be diverted to a purely reactionary path due to
racialist attitudes [Drew 1991:194-199]. Despite the CLSA's
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critique of the WPSA's stress on the agrarian struggle as the
pivotal point of the revolution, it in effect came to a
similar position when it concluded that the rural anti-
imperialist struggle against British imperialism
is the first stage of the struggle. Once, having
got rid of the biggest bandit, we can turn our
attention to the lesser bandit - the local
capitalist class. We can then rally the workers of
South Africa for the final struggle, the overthrow
of capitalism and the setting up of workers' rule
[CLSA 1935:9; my emphasis].
Aside from the particular reference to the Afrikaner
peasantry and bourgeoisie, this passage is remarkably close to
the Native Republic thesis in its conception of an initial
national, rather than class-based alliance against
imperialism!
The division in the Lenin Club provoked a series of
exchanges between South African Trotskyists and the
International Secretariat (IS) of the Left Opposition. Both
the IS and Trotsky argued that the WPSA's conception of the
agrarian question was not adequately related to the national
struggle and that both of these were rooted in British
Imperialism. The IS criticized what it saw as the WPSA's
overly quantitative approach, which led it to overemphasize
the agrarian struggle on the basis of the demographic
predominance of the rural black population, and its mechanical
application of the Russian model to South Africa. Thus, wrote
Ruth Fischer (Dubois) on behalf of the IS, the call for 'Land
to the Natives,* while correct in itself, was inadequate in
that it was not linked to any other political slogan except an
abstract "South African October," echoing Russia's October
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1917 revolution. In effect, she maintained, their conception
of the agrarian revolution lacked political content because it
neglected the national question. The agrarian revolution,
Fischer wrote,
...poses and resolves, at the same time, what one
calls the national question of this country. This
is why the two questions are inseparable. The
thesis, instead of indicating the connection,
neglects it, separating the two sides of the same
question quasi-independently of one another. This
is why this thesis remains weak, not providing any
tactical indications and teaching only an inadequate
and abstract propaganda.
The seemingly nationalist Native Republic thesis, Fischer
contended, might not be antithetical to the socialist
struggle, given the absence of a black bourgeoisie in the
1930s, and it had the potential to mobilize a mass movement
against British imperialism. Indeed, she noted, the WPSA did
not propose any effective counter-slogan to the Native
Republic thesis [International Communist League 1935:15;
translated from the French; Drew 1991:199-209].
Trotsky's own analysis of the South African struggle was
framed in terms of his theory of permanent revolution, which
sought to explain the possibility of a proletarian revolution
in a less developed society, like early twentieth-century
Russia, in the absence of revolution in the advanced
industrialized countries [Trotsky 1982; Burawoy 1988:781-783].
Trotsky argued that in "backwards" countries, those with
relatively recent and limited capitalist development built on
feudal institutions, the weak bourgeoisie is unable to fulfill
popular democratic aspirations. Because of its intermediate
class position in the capitalist era, Trotsky maintained, the
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peasantry cannot play an independent, let alone leading,
political role and will align either with the bourgeoisie or
the proletariat. Hence, the task of completing the bourgeois
democratic revolution falls to the proletariat. Yet its
numerical weakness in backwards countries precludes it from
taking power without the support of the peasant majority, and
an urban-based proletarian revolution could not extend beyond
the bourgeois democratic stage unless class struggle extended
to the countryside as well, enabling the urban proletariat to
gain support from the poorer strata of the peasantry.
Similarly, peasant uprisings are a response to the immediate
question of land ownership and, on their own, would not be
able to destroy the state power which supports landowners. In
this sense, Trotsky concluded, just as the success of the
proletarian revolution depends on the peasantry, the fate of
the agrarian revolution is determined in cities [1982:108].
In this theory, the combined and uneven nature of
international capitalist development sets the parameters for
domestic class struggles and national revolutions.5 This
conception of revolution contains a three-fold notion of
permanence. First, it is temporally permanent in that social
transformation does not proceed through stages but develops
continuously, albeit unevenly and in a combined manner.
Second, it is structurally permanent in that the
interconnection of all struggles against social oppression
based on their common reproduction through capitalist social
relations means that the resolution of one struggle flows into
and shapes the outcome of others. Finally, it is permanent in
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that social revolution in one nation is immanently part of an
international struggle against world capitalism. Thus,
national struggle spills over into the international arena.
Conversely, the failure of a national revolution to gain
international support means that it remains isolated and
limited.
In applying this theory to South Africa, Trotsky [1974]
argued that although any social upheaval in South Africa would
begin from an agrarian revolution, such an upheaval was
predicated on the prior overthrow of British imperialism.
This could occur, he maintained, through either military
defeat or revolution in Britain and its possessions, both
possibilities catalyzing the disintegration of the Empire. In
Trotsky's estimation, a social revolution would in all
likelihood begin first in Britain and would be facilitated by
a movement against British imperialism in the colonies and
dominions. In South Africa, he argued, any proletarian-led
revolution which had the support of the peasantry would
necessarily transform both class and national relations. In
turn, a proletarian dictatorship would allow socialist
reconstruction.
In such a context, he wrote, it was vital that a working
class party support the right of national self-determination.
While it must support the ANC against white supremacy and the
progressive over the reactionary tendencies in the national
movement, its solution to the national question must be based
on the method of class struggle rather than the classless
anti-imperialist front proposed by the Comintern. To mobilize
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the masses, Trotsky suggested, revolutionaries needed to
develop a series of tactical slogans which reflected the
living conditions and struggles of workers and peasants and
which would link the national and agrarian questions.
However, the greatest practical difficulty in propagandizing
amongst the rural masses lay in the fact that black workers
lacked a tradition of organization, while whites were arrogant
and protectionist [Trotsky 1974; Drew 1991:215-217].
Certainly, Trotsky's optimism about the prospects of the
collapse of the British Empire was misplaced, although to a
certain degree he anticipated its post-war dismantling.6 But
in linking the agrarian and national questions to British
imperialist policies and in pointing to the practical
difficulties posed by the racially-divided working class,
Trotsky was essentially advising the South African Trotskyists
to move away from abstractions and to engage with empirical
conditions.
Over the next decade both Trotskyist groupings used
Trotsky's response as a basis for reevaluating the
relationship of the agrarian and national struggles to the
class struggle.7 The WPSA changed its original slogan "Land
to the Native" to the Bolshevik slogan of "Land and Liberty,"
to indicate the interrelationship of the agrarian and
political struggles [cf. Trotsky 1974:253]. The WPSA played
an underground role in the Non-European Unity Movement (NEUM),
and its influence is seen in the 1940s, with the formation of
the Ten Point Programme of minimum democratic demands, in
which the franchise (Point One) is seen as the key to the
21
agrarian question (Point Seven). Likewise, the Fourth
International Organisation of South Africa (FIOSA), successor
to the CLSA, now admitted the significance of the agrarian
question for social mobilization. M. N. Averbach (A. Mon) of
the FIOSA argued that practical implementation of the right to
own land entailed the expropriation of large landholdings and
thus was part and parcel of the socialist struggle:
...the struggle for "democracy" embraces the
struggle...not merely for the right to the land, but
for the actual division of the land....since the
land cannot be won except through a struggle against
imperialism and the South African capitalists, and
since the land can be divided only after it has been
expropriated from the big landowners, farmers and
land-companies, the struggle for land, as part of
the struggle for the realisation of the tasks of
bourgeois democracy in South Africa can be won only
through the socialist revolution...[Mon 1945:7].
Thus, influenced by Trotsky's letter, both the WPSA and the
FIOSA were attempting to apply the notion of a permanent
revolution to South Africa: that democratic demands
represented a transitional program and that the road to
democracy would pass through socialism.
Migrant labor and "tribal proletarians"
Despite the emergence of a Trotskyist tendency in the
early 1930s, that was a still a decade of relative fluidity on
the South African left in terms of political allegiances and
organizational affiliation.8 But by the 1940s, collaborative
work between Communists and Trotskyists was becoming
increasingly difficult. Several conjunctural factors,
including Trotsky's assassination in 1940 and the divergent
attitudes which Trotskyists and Communists took towards the
22
war efforts from 1941 and towards participation in the Native
Representative Council (NRC), contributed to an increasingly
rigid sectarian divide which permeates the South African left
to this day, despite the collapse of the Soviet Union. It is
striking, therefore, that those Communists and Trotskyists who
did engage in rural mobilization in the 1940s and '50s
focussed specifically on migrant labor and the rural reserves.
In this attention to migrant labor, South African socialists
began to grapple in earnest with South Africa's empirical
realities and came closest to breaking from their polarized
conceptions of a homogenous peasantry versus a rural
proletariat.
This concern with migrant labor in the reserves reflected
both the experience of practical organizing difficulties and a
growing recognition of empirical developments in South Africa.
On the one hand, the extreme difficulties of organizing black
farmworkers or labor tenants on white farms, seen in the
brutal smashing of the Western Cape ANC and ICU in the late
1920s and early '30s, meant that to the extent that socialists
were able to organize in rural areas, it was in the reserves
rather than on white-owned farms [Hofmeyr 1985:281-311;
Interview with Alexander 1987],* On the other, the
difficulties which socialists confronted in their repeated
attempts to reach migrant labor on the mines pushed them to
consider reaching them in the reserves [Hoodie 1986:16-17].
Socialist efforts to organize on the mines began in 1930,
when Bunting and Thibedi formed the African Mineworkers Union
(AMWU) [Simons 1983:587]. Later, the tiny Johannesburg WPSA
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made several attempts to reach black mineworkers, seeing
organized black mineworkers "...as the battering ram that will
smash down British Imperialism in South Africa" [International
Communist League 1936:27-28] .10 But it was Max Gordon of the
WPSA, the leading trade unionist on the Rand between the 1935-
40, who successfully fanned the discontent over the
deteriorating war-time conditions so that the defunct AMWU
could be revived [Hirson 1986:235-6; Stein 1978; Basner
1993:223, n. 5]. Following Gordon's internment in 1940 for
opposition to the government's war efforts, the CPSA once
again turned its attention to the mines, and in August 1941
relaunched the AMWU. Kept in check by the CPSA's anti-strike
policy during the war, in 1946 workers engaged in a series of
spontaneous strikes which culminated in a strike initiated by
the AMWU. Although brutally squashed by the state, the strike
demonstrated the explosive character and potential economic
strength of an organized migrant labor force on the mines
[Simons 1983:512, 569-579, 587; Basner 1993:140-141; Moodie
1986:34-35].
Much as Wolf [1987:371-372] would argue later, socialists
saw migrant labor as a vector of transmission facilitating the
diffusion of political ideas from town to country. According
to I. B. Tabata, a member of the WPSA and a rural organizer
for the NEUM-affiliated All African Convention (AAC), the WPSA
realized early on that as long as the reserves remained
unorganized, migrant labor could easily be used by capitalists
to break the strikes of black workers in towns:
Already black workers were fighting for their rights
as workers; but it occurred to us that they were
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isolated because they were the minority at that
time....Whenever the workers from the reserves
asserted themselves they could be sacked and then
they'd just ship in [more] blacks from the reserves
and that factor alone made it absolutely imperative
to organize the peasantry as well [Interview with
Tabata and Gool 1987].
While there is scant evidence that the CPSA tried to
theorize the concepts of the peasantry or migrant labor
[Delius 1993:303], Trotskyists debated the nature of the
reserve population amongst themselves. The WPSA assumed that
rural Africans were overwhelmingly peasants or aspirant
peasants. But the FIOSA's Averbach argued that aside from a
minute layer of farmers scattered about some reserves,
landless Africans were peasants in aspiration only, and those
on white farms were agricultural proletarians. Averbach
coined the term "tribal proletariat" to characterize South
Africa's migrant labor force and rural proletariat, indicating
what he took to be their janus-faced character: proletarian in
day-to-day outlook; peasant in aspirations.
Clearly influenced by Trotsky's [1974] letter, Averbach
pointed out that South Africa lacked the advanced working
class strataumwhich the Bolsheviks had relied on to educate
the masses and link town and country, as only the racist and
protectionist white workers had a tradition of self-conscious
political activity. Thus, he argued, migrant labor could
fulfill the vanguard role which Lenin and Trotsky saw as vital
to the formation of an town-country alliance. However, the
alliance fostered by migrant labor was not the classical
alliance of proletariat and peasantry but one of urban and
rural workers commonly oppressed by their lack of democratic
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rights. Accordingly, Averbach concluded, the basis of this
alliance must be the struggle against the color bar and all
forms of racialism [Mon 1945:6-11].
In his acute awareness of the ongoing proletarianization
of the countryside, Averbach grasped an aspect of change which
the WPSA underestimated. The concept "tribal proletariat"
assumes, as Jordaan has pointed out [Interview 1987], that
migrant labor would necessarily retain rural ambitions and
tribal perspectives and that the major social cleavage to be
overcome was between town and country rather than between
classes or strata. It does not encapsulate the twin processes
of differentiation and disintegration of the peasantry which
Lenin thought to be critical in understanding social
transformation in the countryside. However, the concept
anticipates Wolf's thesis that it is the culturally
conservative middle peasants who engage in migrant labor to
maintain their position on the land who paradoxically play a
progressive social role by transmitting ideas from town to
countryside. It also presages more recent findings about the
operations of the AMWU in the 1940s. Namely, that faced with
the strength of "home-boy" networks on the mines, the AMWU was
often unable to promote a working class consciousness that cut
across tribal affiliations, and that it was the tshipa or
absconders who had broken their links with their rural homes
who formed the main base of the AMWU. Yet, even though the
tshipa were the principal organizers during the series of
black mineworkers1 strikes in 1946, the success of the strikes
depended on making the link between food shortages on the
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mines and drought in the rural areas [Moodie 1986:2-3, 26-27].
Organizing the reserves
It was through their organizational work in the reserves
from the late 1930s through the '50s, that socialists were
able to develop and to modify their ideas about the role of
migrant labor in the countryside. Despite their differences
in social background and organizational allegiance, rural
activists displayed striking similarities both in their
attention to the reserves and their analyses of rural
mobilization and protest. Essentially, they found that it was
in the reserves rather than in towns that social protests
transformed into sustained mass-based uprisings potentially
capable of challenging state power. This rural discontent
reflected the long-term economic deterioration produced by
state policies which locked Africans in the reserves while
stifling the development of an African peasantry. The
observations of rural activists pose a challenge to the
Leninist and Trotskyist argument that it is urban proletarian
struggles which pull and provide leadership for rural
uprisings, and it raises the question of whether socialist
revolution was the viable possibility in the early 1960s that
socialists believed it to be.
By the late 1930s the CPSA was moving away from the
Native Republic thesis, and in 1950, when the CPSA disbanded
following the Suppression of Communism Act, it maintained that
the Africanist call for the right of self-determination meant
the right of political secession, which was tantamount to
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apartheid [Delius 1993:302; SACP 1981:209]. Hence, the
Party's continued focus on urban politics to the neglect of
rural struggles. From the late 1930s through the '50s it was
the exceptional Communist like Alpheus Maliba in Zoutpansberg,
Flag Boshielo in Sebatakgomo and Govan Mbeki in the Transkei
who worked in rural areas. Those Communists who engaged in
rural work tended to be migrant workers who later gained trade
union experience through employment in urban industry, and as
Delius points out, they were clearly much more sensitive to
the possibilities of rural organization than the largely
urban-based Party leaders [Delius 1993: 306-308, 310; Hirson
1977: 4, 6-7; Basner 1993:105-108; cf. SACP 1981:138].
Alpheus Maliba was one such migrant worker-activist who
had been involved with Thibedi's short-lived Communist League
of Africa in 1932, then joined the CPSA in 1936 and from 1939
through 1950 served on the Party's Johannesburg District
Committee. In 1939 he founded the Zoutpansberg Cultural
Association, later renamed the Zoutpansberg Balemi
(Ploughmen's) Association (ZBA) in the Northern Transvaal. It
was there that the state first began implementing its
Betterment Act, ostensibly aimed at stopping erosion in the
reserves, and despite the ZBA's success at resisting this
state intervention, by the 1940s it was declining due to state
repression [Basner 1993:106-108, 219, n. l; Delius 1993:303-
305]. Maliba wrote several political pamphlets based on his
experiences organizing against state intervention. His 1939
pamphlet, The Conditions of the Venda People [SACP 1981:138-
147; Delius 1993:303-304], described an area where subsistence
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production was supplemented by barter of occasional surplus,
and where by the late 1930s, poverty had driven most men into
migrant labor, mainly on the mines, as the white farms already
had large numbers of labor-tenants. The solution to rural
poverty, Maliba argued, was not to kill the cattle, as the
state proposed. Rather, it was to increase the land available
to rural people by redistributing large estates and Crown
lands; to replace the corrupted form of tribal tenure with
individual tenure as an incentive to improve the land; to
establish agricultural schools and to abolish the "useless"
NRC.11
Other Communists engaged in rural organizing, like Flag
Boshielo, drew on Maliba's experience. The Party that
regrouped in 1953 as the underground South African Communist
Party (SACP) was more squarely committed to an alliance with
the ANC, rather than explicit working class politics [Everatt
1991]. Thus, when Boshielo and other Communist migrant
worker-activists formed Sebatakgomo in 1954, they affiliated
it to the ANC. Sebatakgomo was conceived as an organization
linking farm workers and reserve dwellers. Boshielo and other
activists responded to the increasing repression in the
reserves by organizing in urban-based hostels and amongst
migrant workers, and Sebatakgomo's membership grew in the late
1950s as the struggle against Bantu Authorities escalated into
the Sekhukhuneland Revolt in 1958, although its focus became
more localized as its leading activists were banned [Delius
1993:308-309, 311-313].
While Communists worked closely with the ANC, Trotskyists
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either worked in or gave their critical sympathy to the NEUM.
Within NEUM ranks, practical work on the land question was
largely the work of the AAC and its affiliate, the Cape
African Teachers Association (CATA). In contrast to the
migrant labor base of rural activists aligned with the
Congress movement, those in the AAC tended to be teachers, a
reflection of the NEUM's use of "teachers as a vanguard" who
could penetrate South Africa's towns and dorps with
progressive ideas [Kies 1943; Drew 1991:424-430, 470-474].
The different social backgrounds of rural activists in both
political tendencies reflected and reinforced differences in
the social base and outlook of the two wings of the liberation
movement. Through the SACP, the ANC was able to draw in a
wider working class base, but its practice lacked a long-term
strategy. The NEUM's teacher base explains the organization's
continuous efforts to engage with theory and its criticism of
the Congress movement's lack of strategy but it became, over
time, a brake on practical work, although this was far more
accentuated in the Western Cape than in the Transkei, where
pressure for militant action was keen [Alexander 1986].
Both migrant workers and teachers were important points of
access into the reserves in the 1940s and '50s, and their
activities in combatting the state should have been
complementary rather than antagonistic.
The AAC's practical work concentrated on the Transkei and
began in earnest with the struggle against Rehabilitation. In
a pamphlet called The Rehabilitation Scheme: "A New Fraud,"
Tabata [1945], who was born near the farming community of
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Queenstown and organized for the AAC in the Transkei, argued
that the reserve policy was premised on the restriction of
land as the basis of ensuring a cheap migrant workforce. Land
hunger, he concluded, was the root of the problem in the
reserves. As Maliba had, he argued that the means to
rehabilitate the reserves was not to castrate or destroy
cattle, as this would only intensify hunger and malnutrition,
but to increase the land [of. Hendricks 1990:101-102]. This
conception of a land hungry peasantry was voiced in the AAC
organ, Ikhwezi Lomso:
The demand for an equitable distribution of land
among the peasant population is and will continue to
be for a long time the most powerful driving force
of our struggle for it touches the heart-strings of
the majority of the oppressed, the African peasant
[quoted in Jordaan 1959:35],
The first implementation of the Rehabilitation Scheme was
in Libode, West Pondoland in 1947, an area, Ganyile [n.d.]
notes, which had been known for the docility of its
inhabitants, yet the degree of local resistance to
Rehabilitation indicated that preparations against its
implementation had begun well in advance. Government-
sponsored meetings to explain the policy were boycotted,
collaborating chiefs threatened, government officials
attacked, and livestock hidden. The testimony of chiefs and
headmen revealed "...great fears because we people who
accepted the rehabilitation scheme move about among the people
risking our lives" [quoted in Hendricks 1990:112]. People
"...voluntarily formed Location Committees against their
headmen and Bungas [advisory general councils] to assert their
right to decide how they should own their land." AAC
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influence grew, with the affiliation of the clandestine,
mountain-based Kongo movement and the Transkei Organised
Bodies [NEUM 1948:302; AAC 1948:5-6, 14-16; Beinart and Bundy
1980:301-302].
Through the CATA network, teachers linked up small rural
dorps and larger towns. W. M. Tsotsi, later AAC General
Secretary, addressed the Transkei Organised Bodies on the
Rehabilitation Scheme and N. Honono addressed local Vigilance
Committees on the Bantu Authorities Act. CATA activists
successfully promoted boycotts of activities sponsored by
Bantu Authorities, laying the basis for a local branch of the
Society of Voung Africa, another NEUM-affiliate [Hyslop
1986:92-93; Hyslop "CATA and CATU," 11-12; Tsotsi 1953:13].
However, CATA's influence declined in the late 1950s as it was
hit by intense state repression and weakened by internal
dissension in the NEUM. In 1955 the entire CATA executive
were dismissed from their teaching jobs in retaliation to
their struggle against Bantu Education; its members were
harassed into the '60s, and its organ, The Teachers' Vision,
which had appeared regularly since the early '40s, was forced
out of production [NUM 1989:16; Hyslop, "CATA and CATU," 16
and 22ff.].
It is in the analyses of Tabata and Communist Govan Mbeki
that the South African left came closest to developing an
indigenous theory of rural mobilization that reflected local
empirical conditions. Given the intense sectarianism between
Trotskyist and Communists, which was mirrored in the
relationship of the NEUM and the Congress movement, the
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similarity in Tabata's and Mbeki's analyses of rural protests
is striking. Essentially, both conceived the relationship of
urban and rural protests as one of intense, short-lived urban
protests which periodically intersected with slower, longer-
lived rural protests, with migrant labor as the critical link.
Tabata recalls:
We noticed that there was some kind of a seesaw
[relationship]. The workers in the towns would
fight and fight and fight and the graph would go up,
up, up. And the peasantry was simply down there but
now when we had begun to organise the peasantry they
also would be fighting against the Rehabilitation
Scheme and then they would go up. Now the peasants
were very slow in going up while the workers just
went like that (snap) and they reached a zenith and
after that they would come down. The peasants were
simply going slowly up and they crossed at a point.
But now the workers don't go right down to the
bottom, they hold at some point by the peasantry
that's going up [Interview 1987].
The Transkeian-born Mbeki was politically active there
from the early 1940s, first as secretary of the Transkei
Voters' Association, then as general secretary of the Transkei
Organized Bodies from 1943-48. His argument that the rural
areas had a greater capacity to sustain uprisings over a
longer period of time than urban areas overlapped in many
respects with Tabata's, and was echoed by the tiny, ephemeral
Socialist League of Africa [1961:11] a few years later. In
Mbeki's words,
...a struggle based on the reserves had a much
greater capacity to absorb the shocks of government
repression and was therefore capable of being
sustained for a much longer time than a struggle
based on the urban locations. The urban-based
campaign, which starts on a high note after very
intensive and costly propaganda work, consumes
itself by the intense energy it generates to carry
the masses to the climax - usually a general
strike....The struggles of the peasants start from
smaller beginnings, build up to a crescendo over a
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much longer time, are capable of pinning down large
government forces, and are maintained at
comparatively much lower cost [1964:130-131].
The virtually continuous upheaval in South Africa's
reserves, to which Tabata and Mbeki referred, reflected the
widespread reaction to the economic deterioration of and
mounting state intervention in the reserves. In 1955 the
United Transkeian Territories General Council, whose nickname,
Otata Woj' Inj' Emsini (Father has had dog's meat blackened
with smoke], indicated its lack of popular credibility, passed
the Bantu Authorities Act, precursor to the state's future
policy of independence for so-called tribal homelands, and its
acceptance by authorities in other reserves soon followed.
The Act outlined a four-tier authority structure resting on
Tribal Authorities of chiefs and headmen, whose legitimacy
declined as they became direct symbols of the corrupt and
oppressive state. Popular participation in local elections
was curtailed and unauthorized public meetings of more than
ten, prohibited, making open political organizing difficult
and risky [Mbeki 1964:34, 40-42; Beinart and Bundy 1980:305-
306; Delius 1993:303-305].
This repression did not succeed in smothering popular
protests, and an evolutionary pattern of protests can be
discerned, as both Tabata and Mbeki indicated. Initially,
people resisted the various measures designed to strip them of
land and cattle and turn them into perpetual migrant labor.
Later, these protests merged into broader, political struggles
against Tribal Authorities who, in addition to enforcing
rehabilitation, controlled labor influx and efflux.
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The prolonged state of reserve-based protests indicates
that in the 1950s the reserve-based population did indeed have
more capacity to sustain uprisings than urban areas, even
though state intervention was more brutal in the reserves than
in the townships [Lodge 1983:261]. In part, as Mbeki argued,
the reason was tactical and accords with Wolf's thesis that
peasants with tactical leverage over resources or freedom to
maneuver have the greatest potential for sustained
mobilization. In contrast to blacks laboring on white farms,
who had little or no mobility or independence, reserve
dwellers had access both to means of subsistence and to income
from wage labor. Their relative independence from direct
supervision, moreover, enabled them to convert their
traditional institutions for political ends. The 1960
Pondoland uprising in the Transkei, suppressed finally by
armed state intervention and the imposition of a State of
Emergency, demonstrates how a protest against Rehabilitation
became a politicized and broad-based rejection of Bantu
Authorities. Resistance coalesced in a highly structured
organization which led a nine-month revolt, functioned as an
alternative authority, and intimidated with threat of force
those chiefs who did not support the struggle [Turok n.d.;
Lodge 1983:279-283; SACP 1981:271-274, 432-434].
This high degree of solidarity, which helps to explain
the rural capacity to sustain protests, is remarkable given
the stratification and differentiation of reserve dwellers.
In Pondoland, Lodge [1983:279-283] attributes this solidarity
to a number of specific factors: the extreme powers of the
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Paramount Chief whose financial corruption pit him and his
functionaries against the rest of the population; the presence
of an unusually large proportion of unemployed migrant
workers; and a tradition of external political involvement.
Throughout the reserves, women were particularly hard hit by
the Bantu Authorities Acts, and the high degree of female
participation in these protests flowed from their common loss
of communal land and the restrictions on their mobility into
towns.
The class consciousness of reserve-dwellers and migrant
labor was, indeed, far from uniform. Tabata argued that while
the structural position of migrant labor enabled it to link
urban and rural struggles, it also fostered a dual
consciousness, a notion similar to Averbach's janus-faced
tribal proletariat:
The migrant labor played a part in this and
therefore we began now to turn our attention to the
migrant labor and organise them. And we organised
them as peasants. Now they found when they came to
town there were trade unions and they joined the
strikes of the black workers. But they had to go
back again to [the reserves] and fight
Rehabilitation there...which was entirely for the
peasantry. So from the point of view of
organisation they go from one kind of organisation
to another [Interview with Tabata and Gool 1987].
But what Tabata, like Averbach, saw as the dual
consciousness of a seemingly homogenous category was actually
a reflection of a highly differentiated reserve population
with diverse aspirations. In 1946, about 30 per cent of the
reserve population was landless, a similar proportion had no
cattle, and about 60 per cent, had a handful or less. Not
surprisingly, on the mines, it was the most proletarianized
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migrants who tended to be the most militant and who formed the
AMWU's main base of support. Similarly, during the Pondoland
uprising, it was the unemployed migrant sugar workers who
played a central coordinating and organizing role through
their migrant labor associations and 'whose protests against
unemployment and pass laws indicated the need to control the
sale of their labor power. Other reserve dwellers, by
contrast, fought to retain their meager holdings of land and
cattle, while a thin stratum continued to accumulate larger
holdings [Beinart and Bundy 1980:308-309; Hendricks 1990:100-
101].
These findings indicate that the stratified reserve
population, a peasantry that had been disintegrating for
decades, sought control over subsistence and livelihood in a
variety of ways. Their perceptions about how to achieve this
evolved historically as state policies turned them more and
more into rigidly controlled migrant wage labor. Those
reserve dwellers with land and cattle had a vested interest in
their retention, and Beinart and Bundy [1980:303, 311]
hypothesize, drawing upon Mettler [1957], that in contrast to
proletarianized and landless migrants, it was the 'middle
migrants" or "peasant migrants" who had the most to lose from
Rehabilitation who formed the social base of these protests.12
But the common denominator was not a rejection of wage labor
status per se but a desire to prevent their perpetual status
as a particular type of wage labor: rightless and effectively
homeless migrant labor. For many, retention of some minor
means of production would make them less vulnerable to the
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state's efforts to freeze them into total dependency on its
industrial plans. The protests against influx and efflux
controls were struggles for freedom of movement and the free
sale of labor-power; the protests against Bantu Authorities, a
struggle for democracy and self-determination which drew in
all strata and classes.
Yet Tabata and Mbeki did not focus on the actual or
potential differences amongst the reserve population but
stressed it virtually unanimous solidarity. Thus, Mbeki
wrote:
It was in these reserve areas, too, that the
struggle assumed the truly mass character which it
lacked elsewhere. Every peasant had to show himself
in favour of or hostile to Bantu Authorities
[1964:128].
Although the varied responses to Rehabilitation
undoubtedly reflected different class aspirations and
interests, virtually the entire population had a common
interest in fighting Bantu Authorities. Tabata's and Mbeki's
immediate concern was drawing the rural population into the
national democratic struggle, and their practical work aimed
at this common denominator.
A final explanation for the capacity of the reserves in
the 1950s to sustain uprisings lay in the combined nature of
rural oppression. It is notable that Tabata and Mbeki
stressed the strength and endurance of reserve protests, while
most scholarly analyses emphasize their localized and limited
nature. But it was in the reserves that economic and
political oppression merged. There, the state owned the land,
given in trust to Africans, and state administrators
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accumulated wealth through corruption and enforced policies
restricting African autonomy. Virtually all protests in the
reserves during these years indicated the social class
antagonisms emanating from the relationship between
collaboration and capital accumulation. In the Pondoland
revolt of 1960-61, for instance, people attacked chiefs both
because they collaborated with the regime in enforcing these
unpopular measures and because their collaboration was a means
to accumulate wealth [Chaskalson 1987:51-52; Beinart and Bundy
1980:309-310]. Precisely because of the convergence of
economic exploitation and political oppression, the South
African countryside at that period was the base of the
national democratic struggle.
In towns, by contrast, economic and political issues
could be divided. Within the ANC, internal tensions between
its nationalist leadership, still hoping to influence and
accommodate whites, and its trade union membership continually
resurfaced in controversies over tactics which diluted the
success of several campaigns, which were generally single-
issue campaigns. ANC leaders, influenced by Gandhi's passive
resistance, called for mass demonstrations and petitions;
trade unionists pushed for minimum wage campaigns and stay-at-
homes. NEUM leadership resisted the growing pressure from its
youth and left-wing factions for a more activist urban
profile, and even though the NEUM scorned single-issue
struggles in theory, its own campaigns divorced economic and
political issues, eschewing the former as piecemeal and
reformist [Lodge 1983:193-197; Drew 1991:482-488],
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In the 1950s, the predominant form of urban black working
class struggle was not the strike at the point of production
but the stay-at-home, during which workers remained in the
townships rather than going to work. The black trade union
movement, which had been slowly developing since the 'teens,
experienced a brutal setback in 1946 with the smashing of the
black mineworkers' strike, closing a period of trade union
organizing and worker militancy dating from the 1930s. The
1950s trade union movement began rebuilding in the harsh
apartheid era in which blacks were uprooted and relocated into
Group Areas, and strikes were illegal. The overcrowded and
overwhelmingly working class townships provided fertile
conditions for organizing and building solidarity. Yet the
development of the stay-at-home tactic was a response to
social conditions which strengthened racial and national forms
of consciousness, and although this was a working class
tactic, the solidarity it fostered was based on community
rather than explicitly on class. As the Socialist League of
Africa [1961:7-8] argued, the stay-at-home had particular
limitations both for the development of working class
consciousness and for long-term resistance, as state
repression was relatively easy to enforce in the densely
concentrated townships, which had been designed to be easily
sealed off with a minimum number of forces.
Does this mean that the South African case contradicts
the Leninist and Trotskyist thesis that urban proletarian
struggles show greater strength, continuity and intensity than
rural uprisings, which they held to be essentially
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conservative. That argument suggests that when social classes
have reached particular levels of development, all other
things being equal, urban areas will be the moving force for
social transformation. Given the relatively young age of
South Africa's black working class, and the differential
conditions in town and country, it is not surprising, in the
1950s, that reserve-based uprisings showed more capacity for
sustained rebellion. Such capacity has its own implications:
the more prolonged an insurrection or uprising, the greater
the opportunity for the radicalization of political
consciousness. The struggles in the reserves appear to have
been undergoing such a development, as the anti-
proletarianization struggles of the 1940s and '50s matured by
the 1960s into the mass-based struggles for democracy to which
Tabata and Mbeki referred. The relative fragility of urban
working class protests, at that period, compared to reserve-
based struggles, suggests a structural barrier against
socialist transformation.
The NEUM and the agrarian question
Within the NEUM, the decision of Tabata and other AAC
activists to organize in the reserves on a classically
democratic program provoked a controversy which catalyzed its
split in December 1958. To a large degree, but with
significant exceptions, the NEUM split between its two main
organizations, the AAC, strongest in Johannesburg and the
Eastern Cape, and the predominantly Western-Cape based and
urban Anti-Coloured Affairs Department movement (Anti-CAD),
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formed in 1943 to fight the government's attempt to establish
separate political institutions for Coloureds. This split
echoed the South African Trotskyist debates of the 1930s and
•40s, which revolved around a polarized conception of the
peasantry. Both sides concurred in the essential unity of the
land and national questions; hence, their common support of
the Workers' Party slogan 'Land and Liberty" to link the two
struggles. The dispute boiled down to conflicting
interpretations of Point 7 of the NEUM's Ten Point Programme
and the implications for rural mobilization along democratic
and socialist lines. Point 7 read: "Revision of the land
question in accordance with the above," the "above," referring
to the program's preceding democratic demands. The
explanatory remarks attached to Point 7 read:
The relations of serfdom at present existing on the
land must go, together with the land acts, together
with the restrictions upon acquiring land. A new
division of the land in conformity with the existing
rural population, living on the land and working the
land, is the first task of a democratic State and
Parliament.
Strikingly, neither interpretation adequately considered
the differentiated nature and political role of migrant labor.
The majority in the AAC saw rural Africans as peasants or
aspirant peasants and interpreted the abolition of
restrictions on acquiring land as the right to buy and sell
land [SOYA [1954?]; Tsotsi 1954]. Tabata did not believe that
people in the reserves could be mobilized on a slogan of
nationalization: from their perspective the state's
trusteeship of the land was tantamount to nationalization.
For Tabata, who represented a left-pole within the AAC,
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organizing around the right to buy and sell was not
necessarily antithetical to socialism. As Averbach had
earlier, Tabata saw the achievement of such a right as the
pivot of a permanent revolution in that the legal right to buy
land without the means to do so could never satisfy popular
land hunger and that realization would drive people beyond
capitalism. Any new division of land enacted by a democratic
Parliament would reflect the balance of class forces at that
time and could not be stipulated beforehand [Interviews with
Tabata and Gool 1987 and Alexander 1987].
Paradoxically, the other position, articulated by Hosea
Jaffe and the majority of the Anti-CAD, also assumed a high
degree of African peasant consciousness. Because the Ten
Point Programme was a minimum program, Jaffe argued, Point 7
implied a democratic redivision of the land rather than a
maximum socialist demand of collectivization. Redivision
meant the expropriation of large landowners, with abolition of
white control of land and of exploitative practices like
speculation and landlordism, and the allotment of land to
smallholders on an egual, per family basis. Although in
Jaffe's interpretation Point 7 did entail the right to buy and
sell land, a right which would satisfy an aspirant black
bourgeoisie, this would not be able to satisfy the land hunger
of most blacks. In this respect, Jaffe subordinated the right
to buy and sell to the need for an equitable redivision of the
land. Undoubtedly also influenced by Averbach's 'tribal
proletariat" concept, Jaffe assumed that migrant workers or
"peasant-workers' would return to the land, opt for individual
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titles to non-marketable land and apply the technical and
cooperative practices learned in their urban worksites to
agricultural production [Jaffe 1953:24-26],
From outside the NEUM, K. A. Jordaan, a former member of
the then defunct FIOSA, argued that the agrarian question was
not the sub-soil of a South African revolution as it had been
in other revolutions because the majority of the people did
not look to land for their subsistence. South Africa's
democratic struggle differed markedly from classical peasant-
based democratic revolutions because most South Africans had
been uprooted, and those still on the land were a
proletarianized reserve labor force. Unlike classical
democratic revolutions in which the bourgeoisie had been able
to satisfy popular democratic demands, albeit in a delayed,
top-down manner, South Africa's white bourgeoisie, Jordaan
maintained, could not satisfy the democratic demands of the
black majority; indeed, democracy might even undermine
capitalism in South Africa, whose development has been
premised on the lack of democratic rights.
Point 7, Jordaan argued, was internally dichotomous and
ambiguous, containing elements which, from the point of view
of capitalist development were both progressive and backwards.
It did not address social relations on the land after the
initial reallocation of land; thus it sidestepped the class
nature of the future state [Jordaan 1959:32-33]. Underlying
the AAC's demand for the right to buy and sell land, Jordaan
continued, was the aim of creating a yeomanry, modelled on
Stolypin's scheme in pre-revolutionary Russia. But industrial
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South Africa lacked the large peasantry upon which to develop
a yeomanry: the bourgeoisie relied on the superexploitation of
proletarianized reserve-dwellers and would never allow
sufficient numbers to withdraw from the labor market to
develop as independent farmers. To call for the development
of a small strata of black capitalist farmers or peasants in
South Africa's conditions, as the AAC did, was not
historically progressive from the point of view of the working
class, even if it accorded with the laws of capitalist
development. But the Anti-CAD's call to break up and
redistribute large, productive capitalist landholdings using a
quantitative yardstick was economically unviable and Utopian,
assuming that Africans had a prior land claim and would
abandon industry. Jordaan suggested that nationalization
would allow the continuation of large, mechanized farms
conducive to agricultural productivity, enabling a gradual
transition to collectivization [1959:34-38]."
To what extent did the NEUM debates on the land question
engage with the prevailing social realities in the
countryside? As Jordaan pointed out, both sides subordinated
large-scale production to smallholder possession, effectively
ignoring not just the issue of economies of scale on already
mechanized farms but the possible interests of the
agricultural proletariat. If the Anti-CAD's conception of an
equitable distribution of land amongst the entire rural
population was impractical from that point of view, it was
also Utopian in its belief that such farming would necessarily
take place on a household basis, given the extent to which
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rural households had been broken up, even then, and
agricultural cultivation had become predominantly female.
On the other hand, if the AAC's aim was to link up rural
and urban struggles through migrant labor, then why, in
addition to addressing the efforts to forestall
proletarianization, did the AAC not also concern itself with
the landless reserve dwellers who were often the most militant
on the mines or more broadly with labor tenants, who might not
envision their access to land in terms of the right to buy and
sell. As Claassens1 research [1991] shows, many labor tenants
still stake their land claims on their families' long-term
occupancy, disdaining the concept of legal ownership. Even in
the reserves, that right did not always strike a chord. Ralph
Bunche, an African-American social scientist in South Africa
in the late 1930s recounts that one of his Durban informants,
Reverent M'Timkulu, described
...Zulus as not interested in the franchise because
it is foreign to their experience; their thinking is
entirely in terms of land and more land—they think
that if they can get more land their problems will
be solved. But they aren't interested in buying any
land—they think it must be given to them—because
they say the land belonged to their fathers and they
wish it to be given back to them [Bunche Collection;
emphasis in original].
Amongst Trotskyists, then, solutions to the land question
ranged from various schemes for smallholder possession to
large-scale nationalization as a prelude to collectivization.
Can the position that Africans, tired of trusteeship, would
resist nationalization, be reconciled with the position that
nationalization was compatible with widespread rural
proletarianization and productive economies of scale? The
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former position emphasizes subjective aspirations in the
reserves; the latter, objective conditions both in parts of
the reserves and on white farms. What both positions missed
is that the highly differentiated and rapidly changing rural
population made any rigid solutions to the land question very
difficult to maintain in the late 1950s. In that respect,
these opposing views might have been temporarily reconciled
through a practical recognition that a specific socialist
solution to the land question would depend on the variety and
balance of class forces in town and countryside at the time of
a social revolution. Vet, if these opposing positions on the
land question could have been temporarily united under the
banner of "Land and Liberty" in a manner which left open the
path to socialism, how do we explain the intensity and
animosity of the NEUM's disputes on the land question?
The intensity of the theoretical disputes masked the
political crisis facing all socialists which related to the
theory-practice problem. Fuelling the disputes were two
practical problems. Firstly, the question of whether to
organize in the reserves on the basis of a classically
democratic or an explicitly socialist program, a problem which
became more acute after the passage of the Suppression of
Communism Act in 1950, which pushed the entire socialist
movement underground. Secondly, the question of whether to
actively support armed struggle in the Pondoland uprising
against state repression. Despite their fierce theoretical
disputes, neither'socialist tendency nor the NEUM nor the ANC
supplied arms requested by Pondoland militants during their
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uprising.14 In the NEUM, the internal pressure which this
created within its core, the Workers' Party, led to the
organizational split. Only with the banning of black
political opposition following the Sharpeville massacre and
the ensuing nationwide uprising, did socialists begin to
seriously address the issue of armed struggle and attempt to
conceptualize it in relation to rural insurgency.
Conclusion
These experiences of South African socialists indicate
the interrelationship of political theory and practice.
Despite the symbolic significance of land for most blacks and
the massive land-hunger of the rural majority, only a minority
of socialists in either tendency gave their theoretical or
practical attention to rural mobilization. In the late 1920s
and '30s, when socialists began to consider the agrarian
question more seriously, they worked with abstract and
polarized notions of a peasantry and a rural proletariat which
were derived from earlier European experiences and debates
(Lenin 1974; Banaji 1990]. Drawing on the European
experience, Lenin grasped the political economy of a migrant
labor process that was relatively unfettered by state
intervention, and Wolf highlighted the political and cultural
dimensions of this process. However, South Africa's migrant
labor process had its own distinctive characteristics. The
deliberate state policy to stabilize migrant labor as a
permanent social class went counter to capitalism's historical
tendency which links urbanization to proletarianization. It
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also went counter to popular aspirations, both those of the
most proletarianized reserves dwellers who spent most of their
working lives in industrial areas, struggling over working
conditions at their places of employment, and those with
peasant aspirations who needed adequate access to land.
From the late 1930s, through the 1950s, empirical
developments coupled with their own practical efforts in the
reserves compelled socialists to revise the abstract concepts
with which they had initially analyzed the rural population.
To a striking extent the common observations of socialists
organizing in the reserves from the late 1930s through the
'50s overrode their sectarian political divisions. But the
divergent socialist tendencies which permeated the South
African left in the 1920s and '30s produced two different
traditions of theory and practice. Generally, Communists were
consistently stronger in practical work while Trotskyists
excelled at theory. This dichotomy impeded the work of
socialists in the rural areas and the development of socialism
as a movement.
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1. Scholarship on South Africa's agrarian question has been
bifurcated between a structural political economy approach
concerned with the impact of apartheid on class structure and
rural development (Wolpe 1972; Levin and Neocosmos 1989;
Weiner and Levin 1991; Mabin 1991; Marcus 1989) and a social
history approach (Beinart and Bundy 1980; Keegan 1986a, 1986b;
Hendricks 1990:9-11 compares these approaches). Alternative
developmental models envision a society based on articulating
modes of production in which continued proletarianization in
the rural areas is expected to give a working class thrust to
the national struggle (Wolpe 1972; Levin and Neocosmos 1989)
or a neo-classical populism premised on small-scale rural
capitalism. Structural approaches have presumed that rural
political consciousness follows economic class, and
discussions of the political dimensions of the agrarian
question are encoded in debates about class homogenization or
differentiation in the countryside.
2. As Dobb (1963:2-3) notes, definitions of concepts influence
the principles according to which we select variables for
study, form hypotheses and develop analyses and
interpretations of history and politics. To analyze
historical and, hence, changing phenomena with a fixed and
abstract definition might obscure their development; thus the
need to continually reevaluate and modify abstract definitions
by reference to history. By questioning the construction of
Marxist models and concepts, Marxism as a methodology which
attempts to illuminate and explain patterns of social
development can be strengthened (Burawoy 1989) .
3. The peasantry is a class of agrarian subsistence producers
which possess its means of production and includes labor-
tenants and sharecroppers who rent or obtain access to land
owned by other people in exchange for labor, crops or cash.
Unlike feudal lords or the bourgeoisie and proletariat, it is
not specific to a particular mode of production. Its
possession of the means of production is a defining feature
across pre-capitalist and capitalist periods; the
discontinuity comes from the transformation of the relations
of surplus extraction which, under capitalism, increase the
threat of proletarianization. During feudalism, surplus
production was transferred directly to the lord under threat
of coercion. In capitalism the process is more complex.
Typically surplus is extracted through the market but
landlords may extract surplus crops or labor services or the
state may extract surplus through taxation and agricultural
pricing schemes (of. Hilton 1978 and Dobb 1963:1-32 on class).
Most Africanists identify peasants as rural cultivators
who control their means of production, who are generally
organized in subsistence-producing households, who produce a
surplus for other classes, extracted by rent or taxes, and who
possess a distinct peasant culture which nonetheless is
related to the broader social culture. According to Klein
peasants engage in both subsistence and market production,
which distinguishes them from pure subsistence cultivators, on
the one hand, and capitalist farmers, on the other (Klein
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1980:9-13; see also Isaacman 1990:1-2). However, the
differentiation and fragmentation of the household under
capitalism, seen in extreme form in South Africa due to the
migrant labor system, suggests that peasant production cannot
adequately be understood in terms of household production.
4. Luxemburg argued that antagonistic class interests within
nations prevented any collective national will and bourgeois
leadership of a national movement could divert the proletariat
from its own class struggle (Davis 1976:13-15, 27-29;
Luxemburg 1976:150-151). Lenin, by contrast, believed that
insofar as the bourgeoisies of oppressed nations which had not
yet completed their democratic revolutions fought for the
right of national self-determination, they had a progressive
potential. With the October 1917 Russian Revolution, Lenin's
solution, expressed in the slogan, "the right of nations to
self-determination," i.e., the right of oppressed nations to
choose and agitate for political self-determination through
independent statehood, became paradigmatic (Lenin 1971:41-45,
101).
5. Unevenness characterizes social development generally, but
this becomes accentuated under capitalism because of the
system's potential for rapid growth in response to specific
investment opportunities. Combined development refers to the
compressing of different stages of capitalist development.
For example, industrial development in economically backwards
or newly developing countries often outpaces that in earlier
industrialized countries, like Britain, because it is financed
by massive investment with access to the latest techniques.
See Trotsky 1977:27ff.).
6. Whether Trotsky's misplaced optimism and his problematic
assumption that a South African revolution would hinge on
developments in Britain is due to his particular application
of the permanent revolution theory to South Africa or to a
flaw in the theory warrants further consideration.
7. Between 1932-34 the CPSA had briefly resurrected the Native
Republic thesis, with conflicting interpretations. The
dominant position saw the Native Republic as a workers' and
peasants' government but Lazar Bach and L. L. Leepile called
"For Independence and Soviet rule and for the voluntary
unification of the free Native Republics - Basuto, Bechuana,
Swazi, Zulu, Xosa etc. into a Federation of Independent Native
Republics." Umsebenzi, May 5, 1934:1; Simons 1983:473). This
minority thesis was a response to attempts to incorporate the
British Protectorates into the Union of South Africa,
nonetheless, most socialists rejected it on the grounds that
it would reinforce national fragmentation. In this context,
the WPSA initially thought that Trotsky's argument reflected a
mechanical application of the Soviet model of national self-
determination, which in South Africa, they believed, would
reinforce sectional divisions. Interview with R. 0. Dudley,
Cape Town, April 1988.
51
8. Thus, in the All African Convention, formed in 1935 to
fight the state's attempts to curtail African voting rights,
both left-wing Communists and Trotskyists concurred on the
need to boycott the proposed Native Representative Council.
Communist Johnny Gomas felt intellectually closest to the
Trotskyists, even though he disdained what he saw as their
lack of grass-roots activity. Fanny Klenerman, who joined the
Johannesburg WPSA after being expelled from the CPSA,
nonetheless helped distribute the CPSA's organ, Umsebenzi.
Alpheus Maliba, who originally worked with expelled Communist
T. W. Thibedi in the short-lived Communist League of Africa,
joined the CPSA in 1936, but still asked Trotskyists to
publish one of his pamphlets.
9. The neglect of the rural proletariat evoked considerable
criticism by South African leftists. See Ernstzen (1952:11-
12) and Jordaan (1959); interview with Jordaan 1987.
10. The WPSA sold The Spark on the mines, and its ephemeral
Johannesburg organ, Umlilo Hollo, contained a number of
letters from mineworkers and metal workers. Fanny Klenerman
noted in her memoirs that miners came to some of the WPSA's
public meetings ("The South African Workers Party").
11. Reflecting the CPSA's changed policy towards the NRC in
the 1940s, Maliba later campaigned unsuccessfully for a seat
in the NRC (Basner 1993:122).
12. Hendricks (1990:152) seems to doubt the existence of this
stratum, arguing that the minimal efforts to promote a stable
middle peasantry had been untenable, given the economic
conditions of the reserves.
13. More recently, Jordaan (Interview 1977) questioned whether
the failure of collectivized agriculture in the USSR, Tanzania
and Mozambique negated the viability of collectivization for
South Africa. Unlike those cases, he argued, South Africa's
relative industrialization would preclude the need for state-
driven primitive socialist accumulation based on exploiting
the peasantry. Moreover, state policy had prevented a private
property tradition amongst blacks, in contrast to Europe's
long tradition of private possession or ownership, suggesting
that resistance to collectivization would not be as great in
South Africa as in other countries.
14. For the NEUM's response to the request for arms see Drew
(1991:474-505); for the ANC, verbal communication from Howard
Barrell, St. Antony's College, Oxford, 4 April 1992.
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